




Knowledge, Information & Society

JAKE CHANDLER

Week 2 Wrap-up




This week

- An optional crash course in basics of probability
- Some first responses to Gettier:
 - NO FALSE GROUNDS
 - worries that is it too weak (CLOCK)
 - worries that it is perhaps even too strong (HANDOUTS)
 - INFALLIBILITY
 - worries that this is too strong (rampant ignorance)
 - supporting the move via J-INFALLIBILITY and the Lottery argument
 - NO DEFEATERS
 - argued by some to be too strong (MAD MRS GRABIT)

Group discussion


In small groups (3-4) discuss the following questions (and then we'll have a whole class discussion):



- (1) The MONOTONICITY condition means that (a) whether or not one is justified in believing a proposition P on the basis of an item of evidence E is *only* a matter of its being the case that the probability of P given E is above a certain threshold t . It also means that (b) this threshold is the same for *all* pairs of propositions. Can you think of possible reasons to think that either of these assumptions may fail?

Group discussion (ctd)

In small groups (3-4) discuss the following questions (and then we'll have a whole class discussion):



- (2) Do you find Unger's defense of J-INFALLIBILITY compelling? What about my concern about its inability to explain contrasting intuitions about Gettier vs non-Gettier cases?
- (3) What are your view on the MAD MRS GRABIT case? Is there a convincing response on behalf of NO DEFEATERS?

Next week

- Topic: Two last responses to Gettier and a worry that the Gettier problem may have no solution at all!
- Required reading:
 - Pritchard, D. *WTK*, Ch. 6 (sections on Reliabilism)
- Recommended reading:
 - Feldman, R. 2003: *Epistemology*. Pearson. Ch 5. (not available in LMS)
 - Goldman, A.I. 1967. A Causal Theory of Knowing. *Journal of Philosophy* 64: 357-72.
 - McGlynn, A. 2014: . *Knowledge first?* Palgrave Macmillan. Chapters 1 to 4.
 - Williamson, T. 2011: Knowledge first epistemology. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. London: Routledge, pp. 208-218.
 - Zagzebski, L. 1994: The inescapability of Gettier problems. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 44(174), pp. 65-73.