

- In a nutshell:
Knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the true belief it entails is more likely to persist, other things being equal ('other things being equal', because some dogmatically held merely true beliefs might be more persistent than some true beliefs that qualify as knowledge)

Kvanvig and Fricker's response

- Kvanvig (2003) complains:
 - 'When we compare knowledge with true beliefs fixed by evidence that do not count as knowledge, we find no obvious pattern favoring the retention of the former over the latter'
- Fricker (2009) concurs, telling us that the kinds of cases which Williamson bases his claim on (violations of NO DEFEATERS) suggest 'mirror image examples of circumstances in which knowledge is more readily lost than mere true belief'

Hyman's response

- Hyman (2010) offers some different objections:
 - **Unlikely undermining**: Mere JTB is supposedly less valuable due to the *in principle* possibility of rational undermining. But the *actual* probability of this happening could be vanishingly small
 - Can you think of an example?
 - **Limited shelf life**: Knowledge is supposedly more valuable because it promotes the future maintenance of true beliefs. But some true beliefs have 'limited shelf life':
 - 'For example, it is important for me to have a true belief now about the time I am due to meet a visitor this afternoon...But by next Wednesday, it probably won't matter whether I have retained [this belief].'
- Rejoinder: OK, knowledge sometimes has little value over true belief, just as true belief sometimes has little value over false belief

Kvanvig and Fricker's response (ctd)

- Fricker's example:
 - GORDON BROWN**: 'A visitor to the U.K. forms the true belief that Gordon Brown is a powerful figure in British politics on the basis that Gordon Brown is Chancellor of the Exchequer. But then when (shortly after the visitor has left, and unbeknownst to her) Gordon Brown stops being Chancellor to become Prime Minister, her knowledge is lost—yet her true belief remains.'
- What do you make of the rejoinder? (Let's discuss this in the tutorial!)

Added social value?

- Here is another way of putting NO DEFEATERS to work (loosely inspired by Olsson's (2011) reading of Kant)
- The idea is that it is not the potential undermining of the true belief *in the believer* that matters so much as the potential undermining of the belief *in others*
- If my true belief satisfies NO DEFEATERS, then any grounds that I could provide to back it up should be found persuasive by any rational individual who does not hold certain relevant false beliefs (e.g. in the *non*-Gettiered clock case, falsely believing that the clock has stopped)
- Knowledge is then true belief with a certain power of persuasion: it adds **social value** to something already valuable

What about other 4th conditions?

- If
 - (1) Knowledge genuinely is more valuable than mere JTB, *and*
 - (2) Williamson/Olsson are right in finding additional value in No DEFEATERS,then it looks like No DEFEATERS could have an edge over its competitors...
...unless a parallel story can be given there. Do you think it can?

References

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- Hyman, J. 2010. The Road To Larissa. *Ratio*, 23: 393–414.
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- Olsson, E.J. 2011: The Value of Knowledge. *Philosophy Compass* 6(12): 874–883.
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