

- ## Loose talk

WAMs for sceptics

- Unsurprisingly, the *sceptical* invariantist's response to *epistemic* contextualism proceeds along the same broad lines
- What follows $\approx$ early Unger's line sketched in Week 2
- In connection with our zebra scenario, you ask me:
 'Do you know whether that's a zebra?'
- The invariantist will claim that, in responding with the following, what I say is *false*:
 'I know that's a zebra'
- What is *meant*, however, is claimed to be true
- What might that be? Perhaps be something like:
 'I know *that if this is an average zoo, then* that's a zebra'

References

- Bach, K. 2000: Quantification, Qualification, and Context: A Reply to Stanley and Szabo. *Mind & Language* 15(2-3), pp. 262-283.

WAMs for sceptics (ctd)

- Why didn't I say what I meant?
- Note: I presumably think that the hearer will share my assumption that the zoo is a normal one
- Hence, speaking the literal truth would have been:
 - at best *unnecessary*: the hearer would have concluded that it's a zebra either way
 - *longer* and harder to process
 - at worst *misleading*: it could have suggested that the hearer should worry that the zoo is not your average one