




Knowledge, Individuals & Society

JAKE CHANDLER

Lecture 7 Wrap-up



This week


- Closure denialism:
 - Dretske's motivations
 - How SENSITIVITY leads to failure of closure
 - Dretske's suggested WAM
- The contextualist approach to the problem:
 - Not just pronouns and adverbs, but also gradable adjectives and quantified phrases may be context sensitive
 - The verb 'to know' might be similarly sensitive, possibly *because of* the sensitivity of, say, quantified phrases
 - While the conclusion of the argument from ignorance is true when uttered in that context, we are uneasy with this because we fail to see that this is consistent with the same claim's being false when uttered in 'ordinary' contexts

This week (ctd.)

- Two complaints about epistemic contextualism
 - Schiffer on meta-semantic blindness
 - Conee on contextualist approaches to quantifier phrases
- A WAM on behalf of the sceptic
 - Bach's line on quantified phrases and gradable adjectives (we say something false but communicate something true)
 - A sceptical line modelled on Bach's discussion

Group discussion

In small groups (3-4) discuss the following questions (and then we'll have a whole class discussion):



- (1) In the lecture, I quoted some excerpts from Dretske's writings in which he suggests a WAM on behalf of Closure Denialism. Do you find it convincing? If so, why so? If not, why not?
- (2) Do you agree that Epistemic Contextualism is implausible because competent speakers do not seem to be aware of the alleged context sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions?

Group discussion (ctd)

- (3) Explain and assess Conee's "Mr Stickler" objection to Contextualism about quantified phrases.
- (4) Do you find my attempt to defend Skepticism by drawing on Bach's distinction between (a) what is said and (b) what is meant to be a plausible one? If so, why so, If not, why not?

Next week

- Topic: Democratising epistemology: The use of survey methods
- Required reading:
 - Beebe, J. 2012: Experimental Epistemology. In A. Cullison (ed.), *Companion to Epistemology*, Continuum, pp. 248–69. Sections I and IV.
- Recommended reading:
 - Goodin, R. & K. Spiekermann 2018: *An Epistemic Theory of Democracy*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2, 3 & 15.
 - Weinberg, J.M., S. Nichols & S. Stich. 2001: Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. *Philosophical Topics* 29, pp. 429–460.
 - Weinberg, J.M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J. 2010: Are philosophers expert intuiters? *Philosophical Psychology*, 23(3), pp. 331–355.
 - Weinberg, J.M. 2010: Experimental Epistemology. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds.), *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. New York: Routledge, pp. 823–835. Sections I and III.