

Cultural variability (ctd)

- Results (really knows vs merely believes):
 - Westerners: 32% vs 68%
 - East Asians: 12% vs 88%
- Again, the relevant p-value was low enough for them to reject the null hypothesis of no association
- But sensitivity to cultural factors wasn't the only sensitivity observed in relation to this case

Gender sensitivity

- Starmans & Friedman (2012) have reportedly found evidence for an association between gender and Gettier intuitions
- They polled a number of undergrads (84 men, 56 women) in relation to the following:

'Peter is in his locked apartment, and is reading. He decides to have a shower. He puts his book down on the coffee table. Then he takes off his watch, and also puts it on the coffee table. Then he goes into the bathroom. As Peter's shower begins, a burglar silently breaks into Peter's apartment. The burglar takes Peter's watch, puts a cheap plastic watch in its place, and then leaves. Peter has only been in the shower for two minutes, and he did not hear anything.'
- Question: does Peter 'really know' that there is a watch on the table, or does he 'only believe' it?

Order sensitivity

- Swain *et al* (2008) considered the possible effects of prior presentation of cases of clear knowledge or clear non-knowledge
- Question: to what extent do you agree with the relevant knowledge attributions on a 5-point scale (3 = neutral)?
- Result (mean response in accidental reliability case):
 - No prior clear case: 2.8
 - Prior clear case of knowledge: 2.4
 - Prior clear case of non-knowledge: 3.2
- The relevant p-value was low enough for them to reject the null hypothesis of no association

Gender sensitivity (ctd)

- Results (really knows vs merely believes):
 - Males: 41% vs 59%
 - Females: 71% vs 29%
- The relevant p-value was low enough for them to reject the null hypothesis of no association

Morals drawn

- Nichols *et al* (2003), draw the following strong conclusions from the results of Weinberg *et al* (see also Alexander & Weinberg 2007):

‘[Our] intuitions are simply not to be trusted. If the epistemic intuitions of people in different groups disagree, they can’t all be true. The fact that epistemic intuitions vary systematically with culture...indicates that these intuitions are caused (in part) by culturally local phenomena. And there is no reason to think that the culturally local phenomena that cause our intuitions track the truth any better than the culturally local phenomena that cause intuitions that differ from ours.’

References

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