

Group discussion (ctd)

- (3) We previously discussed the Lottery argument for Infallibilism—i.e. the view that, in order to have knowledge, the probability for the truth of the relevant belief must be 100% given one's evidence. Could one not construct an analogous argument for the Unanimity voting rule—i.e. the view that in order for a proposition to be believed at the group level, the proportion of votes for that proposition must be 100%? If so, what would the premises be? (In essence: rephrase the premises of the Lottery argument in terms of judgment aggregation)

Next week

- Topic: The value of cognitive diversity
- Required reading:
 - Goodin, R. & K. Spiekermann 2018: *An Epistemic Theory of Democracy*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 7 & 8.
- Recommended reading:
 - Landemore, H. 2021: An epistemic argument for democracy. In M. Hannon & J. de Ridder (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology*. Routledge.
 - Steel, D. *et al* 2018: Multiple diversity concepts and their ethical-epistemic implications. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* 8, pp. 761–780.